



*The Collegium Institute
Annual Newman Lecture
“Newman and the Limits
of Dogma”*

*Presented by Professor Eamon Duffy
Cambridge University
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The Collegium Institute 2021 Annual Newman Lecture featured Professor Eamon Duffy of Cambridge University, renowned author of *The Stripping of the Altars* and many other monographs on the history of the Reformation and the Catholic Church as well as, most recently, *John Henry Newman: A Very Brief History*.

The Annual Newman Lecture is part of a broader effort to rejuvenate the intellectual legacy of John Henry Newman at the University of Pennsylvania, which was the home of the first Newman Club in America. Recent Newman Lectures have been delivered by Thomas Pfau, Paige Hochschild, David Deavel, Ryan "Bud" Marr, John Garvey, and the late Don Briel. The 2021 Newman Lecture was cosponsored by the Penn Newman Catholic Community, Penn's Program for Research on Religion & Urban Civil Society (PRRUCS), Harvard Catholic Forum, Nova Forum for Catholic Thought, University of Dallas Program for Studies in Catholic Faith & Culture, Portsmouth Institute, St. Thomas Catholic Studies MA program, Lumen Christi Institute, American Catholic Historical Association, National Institute for Newman Studies, the Department of Catholic Studies at Duquesne University, University College Dublin Newman Centre for the Study of Religions, Center for Catholic Studies at Durham University, and Maynooth University: Irish Centre for Faith and Culture.

Preview

In his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864), John Henry Newman emphasized his life-long commitment to the centrality of dogma to authentic Christianity. A fierce opponent of heresy while an Anglican, in the 1860s and 1870s the Catholic Newman dedicated much of his energy and considerable public prestige to combatting what he perceived as the inflationary and excessive dogmatism which threatened the intellectual and spiritual integrity of the Church under Pope Pius IX. In this talk, Professor Duffy considers the fundamental consistencies underlying the apparent contradictions in Newman's developing understanding of the relation between revealed truth and intellectual freedom.



In this talk, I want to reflect on the apparent contradiction in Newman's thought and his behavior. The Anglican Newman was notoriously a ferocious defender of doctrinal orthodoxy, at times even a heresy hunter. He thought the visible church, by which he meant the Anglican church, was the custodian of God's truth, and that it was the duty of Christians to submit to the church's dogmatic teaching. As he famously wrote in the *Apologia*, "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion: I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of

religion.”¹ And, of course, he never abandoned that conviction. As a Catholic he spoke repeatedly of the Church as the “Oracle of God”, and in his best-known poem the dying Gerontius declares:

And I hold in veneration
For the love of Him alone
Holy Church as His creation
And her teachings as His own

And yet, the most striking feature of Newman's Catholic career from the early 1850s onwards was ardent opposition to dogmatism. He was consistently patient and supportive of correspondence on penitents who were troubled or doubting, and both in private and, increasingly, in public he could be savagely critical of what he considered the overbearing exercise of authority in the Church. Most notorious was his public opposition to the definition of papal infallibility and his slow and reluctant acceptance of the definition once it had been passed. Superficially, it is as if there were two Newmans: the Catholic and the Anglican. Or is there, in fact, a strong thread of continuity between these two apparently very different frames of mind? Newman's Anglican campaigns for dogma were directed against two distinct targets. On the one hand, there was the evangelical party to which he himself had once belonged. He thought evangelicals valued no doctrines unless they contributed directly to conversion, so they neglected or dismissed everything for which they couldn't see an immediate pastoral

¹ John Henry Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, ed. Martin Svaglic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 54.

use. So the doctrine of Justification by Faith seemed to them the heart of the Christian faith, even though it didn't feature in any of the ancient creeds, whereas evangelicals of his time were prone to play down the importance of orthodox Trinitarian belief because it seemed arcane and abstract and didn't have a direct bearing on the great evangelical experience of conversion.

And then on the other hand there were the rationalizers, liberalizing Christians like Dr. Thomas Arnold of Rugby or nearer at hand in Oxford Professor Wrenn Dixon Hamden who Newman pursued. They insisted on the rationality of Christianity and so viewed the doctrine of the Trinity not so much as mystery, but rather mystification. So, Newman thought, they saw the Church's historic dogma as, at best, complicating and, at worst, compromising the essential simplicity of the original and essentially moral teaching of Jesus. Newman considered that both evangelicals and rationalizers were alike in thinking that they knew exactly what Christianity was all about. Whereas for Newman, at the heart of the Christian faith was the immense mystery of God, about which human beings could speak only in stumbling metaphor. His own special field of study was the Greek writings of the early Christian fathers of the city of Alexandria: Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and St. Athanasius. From them he learned to think of Christian doctrine as a necessary but inadequate attempt to put into the littleness of human language immensities that could only be hinted at. As he wrote in the *Apologia*, looking back to his Anglican days:

...I understood them to mean that the exterior world, physical and historical, was but the outward manifestation to our senses of realities greater than itself...Holy Church...will remain, even to the end of the world, only a symbol of those heavenly facts which fill eternity. Her mysteries are but the expression in human language of truths to which the human mind is unequal.²

So, as an Anglican, Newman insisted on the need for humble reception of the solemn formulas of the faith, the Church's attempt, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to speak of the essentially hidden things of God. But he never forgot the inescapable limitations of credal language. Dogmatic definitions, he thought, were necessary, but they were a tragic necessity imposed on the Church by the distortions of heretics. The “technicality and formalism” of doctrinal definitions all involved a diminishment of the mysteries that they would design to articulate. As he said in one of his sermons, “we count the words of the Fathers, and measure their sentences, and so convert doxology into creeds.”³

And the very fact that we're utterly in the dark about the relative importance or consistency of the separate articles of the faith is a reason, not for setting them aside, but of holding fast to the “form of sound word”, because, again, as he said in a sermon:

We have no means of knowing how far a small mistake in the Faith may carry us astray. If we do not

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36–7.

³ Eamon Duffy, *John Henry Newman: A Very Brief History* (London: SPCK Publishing, 2019), pp. 26–7.

know why it is to be proclaimed to all...much less do we know why this or that doctrine is revealed, or what is the importance of it.⁴

But Newman made a wider claim than this to the faithful obedience of the believer: The articles of the Creed weren't just abstract notions. They were the seeds of a living religious system, manifestations of a life. The Creeds weren't meant to be bare bones, the distilled essence or skeleton of Christianity. Rather, when meditated on and lived out, they blossomed in history into the great multifaceted complex organism that we call Christianity. The Creeds, formulated before Christendom divided, were infallible. But even the fallible aspects of subsequent Christian life had value. So in addition to affirming the Creeds, believers needed to attend to the whole body of the Church's life and teaching, which made up the shape of Christian life. To drive this home, Newman made a highly original distinction between what he called the "Episcopal" and "Prophetical" traditions in the Church.

"Episcopal tradition" was the body of revealed truth—dogma, summarized in the Creeds, confessed by us all at our Baptism, and passed down the ages from bishop to bishop, in his words, "to be received according to the capacity of each individual mind."⁵ But, in addition, there was a subordinate, but still authoritative "Prophetical tradition", which

⁴ John Henry Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, vol. 2, pp. 246–7, 259–60, 265.

⁵ John Henry Newman, *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church*, pp. 226-7.

represented the legitimate outworking of those fundamental beliefs as they shaped the lived experience of the Church. This much wider Prophetic tradition was, in his words:

...a vast system...consisting of a certain body of Truth, permeating the Church like an atmosphere, irregular in its shape from its very profusion and exuberance: at times separable from the Episcopal tradition, yet at times, melting away into legend and fable; partly written, partly unwritten, partly the interpretation, partly the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in intellectual expressions, partly latent in the spirit and temper of Christians; poured to and fro...upon the housetops, in liturgies, in controversial works, in obscure fragments, in sermons...existing primarily in the bosom of the Church itself and recorded in such measure as providence has determined in the writings of eminent men.⁶

This prophetic tradition was fallible and susceptible to corruption. Error and abuse had crept into it over time. Nevertheless, it originated with God. That whole body of teaching, worship, experience, and their favorite tractarian word ‘ethos,’ the fallible, as well as the infallible, was the vehicle through which saving truth actually reaches us. So, he said, “the doctrine of the Creed runs into the general Prophetic tradition.”⁷

There was no hard or fast lining to be drawn between the fundamental truths of the Creed and the embodiment and elaboration of those truths in the Church's experience and

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

tradition. The Prophetic tradition was a system to be inhabited and used, not quizzed or minimized. The appropriate frame of mind in matters of faith was a willingness to be taught, a reverent receptivity in the Christian “either to believe and love what he hears, or to wish to do so, or at least not to oppose but to be silent.”⁸

At the end of his Anglican career, Newman returned to these issues, which he’d been exploring in the late 1830s, from a rather different perspective, and the place where he revived his thinking about this was his *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. That book was written to provide a rationale for Newman’s identification of the modern Roman Catholic Church with the ancient Church of the Fathers and the Councils. He now suggested that his earlier thinking about the Prophetic tradition unwittingly constituted a powerful argument for the necessity of a living infallible authority, such as was claimed by Roman Catholicism.

Christianity was a social religion, based on a creed acknowledged as divine in origin, but issuing, in his words, “in a multiplicity of developments, true or false or mixed”, which inevitably made “distinct impressions on different minds.” It therefore needed a “supreme authority ruling and reconciling individual judgements by a divine right and recognized wisdom” in order to discern true from false, benign from harmful. So he wrote:

⁸ Ibid.

...there can be no combination on the basis of truth, without an organ of truth... If Christianity is both social and dogmatic, and intended for all ages, it must humanly speaking, have an infallible expounder.⁹

Now, as is well known, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* represented Newman's realization that the formation of Christian tradition was a process that involved error as well as truth. Famously in the essay, he suggested seven tests or notes by which you could distinguish the true from the false. But as a Catholic he would increasingly insist that this process required a communal process of discernment. Truth emerged from a labor in which many forces and many people had a hand. So for him, the infallibility of the Church was a charism shared by the whole Church, expressed in different ways at different times. It was not the sole prerogative of the Pope, though he accepted that papal decisions had a special and privileged place in the process.

Now, belief in infallibility would, of course, remain foundational for Newman's understanding of Catholicism. In the final chapter of the *Apologia* he would articulate his own, in his phrase, "absolute submission" to the power of infallibility which "claims to know for certain the very meaning of the Divine message in detail."

I believe the whole revealed dogma as taught by the Apostles, as committed by the Apostles to the Church, and as declared by the Church to me... and (implicitly) as it shall be, in like manner, further

⁹ John Henry Newman, *An Essay on Development*, pp. 117, 127–8.

interpreted by that same authority till the end of time.¹⁰

But as his famous published letter to the Duke of Norfolk in 1874 would make clear, his understanding of infallibility was by no means the blank check for dogmatic authority that his words might seem to imply.

So Newman from his Anglican days had a strong sense of the mysteriousness of Christian truth, and a realization, almost unique in the Catholic Church of the 19th century, that doctrine had a history, and that true doctrine represented a long cooperative labor of exploration of the mystery by the whole Church. But in the Catholic Church of the 1850s and 60s, there were loud voices insisting that Christian teaching in fact was crystal clear and we had easy and immediate access to it. In the person of the pope, the Church had an oracle whose teaching cut through all confusion and obscurity. Newman was increasingly alarmed by the hyper-Catholicism of those who regarded papal infallibility as a form of revelation-on-tap, a license to print new dogmas.

For him, infallibility was essentially an instrument of last resort, an aid in determining amidst all the richness and complexity of the tradition what developments were true to the original “depositum”. Infallibility was neither inspiration nor a source of new knowledge. It was a “condition”, a guarantee that in discerning what was or wasn’t a healthy development of the core Christian tradition, the Church

¹⁰ Newman, *Apologia*, pp. 224–5.

would not go fundamentally astray. But there was nothing slick or easy about that guarantee. There was a long historical process in which individual personalities, cultural circumstances, the passing of time, and what he called “the clash of Catholic mind on Catholic mind”, all had parts to play. And almost alone among Catholic theologians at the time, he thought the laity, as well as the clergy, had their role to play in discerning just what was central and what was marginal to the Church’s faith. His Anglican studies of the history of the Arian controversies of the 4th century had taught him that back then when most bishops had fallen into doctrinal error, it was the laity, in the form of the monks of Egypt, who had remained instinctively loyal to the faith of their fathers.

Now, one of the most vocal of the propagandists for the papalist hyper-Catholicism that Newman deplored was one of his own former disciples, William George Ward, a convert from exactly the kind of rationalist liberal Christianity that Newman had fought as an Anglican. Ward had a rat-trap sort of mind, open and shut, black and white, and he was now a gleeful cultural warrior, convinced of the imminence of what he called an “internecine war... between the army of dogma and the united hosts of indifferentism and unbelief.” Ward looked to unlimited papal infallibility as “the one solid and inexpugnable fortress for the army of dogma.” Those are his words—and notice the confrontational military metaphor. Ward wrote:

We cannot submit to the Pope’s authority by *halves*; we cannot accept what we please and reject what we

please; we must humbly embrace that whole body of Christian doctrine, which he infallibly inculcates.¹¹

For Newman, by contrast, the reckless inflation by which every formal papal utterance was deemed to become dogma only served to undermine real confidence in the Church as teacher. To treat papal teaching as above and beyond conditions or controls was, he believed, a disturbing novelty. Truth required a process, which couldn't be short-circuited: The discernment of doctrine was an aspect of the Church's inescapable journey through time, and to attempt shortcuts was to try to evade the means by which the Spirit guided the Church into truth. So he wrote:

This age of the Church is peculiar—in former times there was not the extreme centralization which is now in use. If a private theologian said anything, another answered him. If the controversy grew, then it went to a Bishop, a theological faculty, or to some foreign University. The Holy See was but the court of ultimate appeal. Now, if I as a private priest put anything in print, *Propaganda* answers me at once. How can I fight with such a chain on my arm?... There was true private judgment in the primitive and medieval schools. There are no schools now, no private judgment (in the religious sense of that phrase), no freedom of opinion. That is, no exercise of the intellect. This is a way of things which in

¹¹ William George Ward, *A Second Letter to the Rev. Father Ryder* (London: Burns, Oates, & Co., 1868), p. 65.

God's own time, will work its own cure of necessity.¹²

Newman rejected cultural warfare which he thought sterilized the Church's mission to address the world and locked it into a ghetto. So, he complained to his friend Emily Bowles, "We are shrinking into ourselves, narrowing the lines of communion, trembling at freedom of thought, and using the language of dismay and despair at the prospect before us."¹³

So it was inevitable in the 1860s that he would turn his attention to the debates about infallibility. In 1865, as the First Vatican Council began to be planned, Newman began a series of jottings in his private notebooks on the limits of papal teaching. Those notebooks make fascinating reading. Papal and other solemn ecclesiastical condemnations, he believed, were often statements of "abstract" principles, which can't be taken as simple directives either for thought or action, as extremists like Ward wanted to treat them. Reason and common sense governed the practical application of abstract principle, even in matters of morals

¹² John Henry Newman to Emily Bowles, May 19, 1863, in *Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, vol. 20, *Standing firm amid Trials: July 1861 to December 1863*, ed. Charles Stephen Dessain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 445–8.

¹³ John Henry Newman to Emily Bowles, November 11, 1888, in *Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, vol. 22, *Between Pusey and the Extremists: July 1865 to December 1866*, ed. Charles Stephen Dessain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 314–5.

and doctrine. In practice, such concrete applications might in practice amount to direct contradiction. One of his favorite examples, which he comes back to again and again, was Pope Benedict XIV's 1745 encyclical *Vix Pervenit*, in which the Pope had unequivocally reaffirmed the medieval Church's absolute ban on lending and borrowing of money at interest. But in 1745, the year of that encyclical, the whole Catholic world—including Pope Benedict XIV—routinely borrowed and loaned money at interest.

So Newman argued the encyclical was a “dogmatic brief which I believe neither at the time nor now (still more) has any practical use whatever.”¹⁴ It followed that Catholics were not obliged to give unlimited “internal assent” to encyclicals or other routine papal utterances, which articulated ideals, but were often clearly detached from actual circumstances.¹⁵ There were no shortcuts, therefore, to religious certainty, no tap to turn to whenever doctrinal or moral guidance was desired because there was no substitute for time and prayerful engagement. His opposition to the definition of infallibility in 1870 was motivated in large part by his conviction that things “were moving too fast in Rome.” Doctrinal development and the discernment of the

¹⁴ John Henry Newman, “The Infallibility of the Church and the Dogmatic Power of the Pope, 1866,” in *Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Biblical Inspiration and on Infallibility*, ed. J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 117–8.

¹⁵ John Henry Newman, “Notes for Ryder, 1867,” in *Theological Papers*, p. 149.

Church's faith was necessarily a collaborative process, and one that took time, typically centuries. So, as he wrote to a fellow, Robert Witty:

...we do not move at railroad pace in theological matters even in the 19th century... The Church moves as a whole; it is not a mere philosophy; it is a communion... What we require, first of all, and it is a work of years, is a careful consideration of the acts of Councils, the deeds of popes, the Bullarium. We need to try the doctrine by facts, to see what it may mean, what it cannot mean, what it must mean. We must try its future working by the past. And we need that this should be done in the face of day, in course, in quiet, in various schools and centers of thought, in controversy... This is the true way in which those who differ sift out the truth."¹⁶

These were dangerous views in the 1860s and 1870s, and he repeatedly lamented the lack of intellectual freedom in the Church. But Newman rarely criticized authority in print and never papal authority, at any rate, directly. The discrepancy between Newman's public deference on the one hand, and his repeated complaints in private about the actual exercise of authority in the Church on the other hand, were a source of frustration to many of his friends. Newman explained his silence as the product of his own gradualist ecclesiology; truth emerged not from confrontational gestures, but from the corrective and necessarily drawn-out processes of debate, assimilation, and reception of ideas. Dogmatism might be the

¹⁶ John Henry Newman to Robert Whitty, S.J., April 12, 1870, in *Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, vol. 25, *The Vatican Council: January 1870 to December 1871*, pp. 94–96.

vice, not merely of the authorities, but also of theologians and speculative thinkers whose views, even when true, might wound consciences if they were articulated prematurely. There was a duty to step delicately where the faith and sensibilities of others were in question. “The duty of obedience” might in his words, “occasion silence of acquiescence...or at least very cautious and restrained avowals of opposition.”¹⁷

That was his public stance. In private, he was clear about his determined opposition to dogmatism, as opposed to dogma. To those struggling with the infallibility definition, his advice was both practical and humane, and in striking continuity with what he had once argued about the duty of an Anglican towards the Prophetic tradition. Back then in the 1830s, he’d said that the Anglican leader had an obligation “to believe and love what he hears or to wish to do so, or at least, not to oppose, but to be silent.”¹⁸ To Catholics troubled about the 1870 definition, he advised:

Your duty lies in observing two conditions, both of them in your power. First, make an act of faith in all the Holy Church teaches, and secondly, as regards this particular doctrine, turn away from any doubt, which rises in your mind about its truth. These two acts are in your power, and they are sufficient.¹⁹

¹⁷ John Henry Newman, “Letter to Flanagan, 1868” in *Theological Papers*, pp. 155–6.

¹⁸ Newman, *Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church*.

¹⁹ John Henry Newman to Ambrose St. John, July 27, 1870, in *Letters and Diaries*, vol. 25, *The Vatican Council*, p. 168.

Newman had a deep and pragmatic confidence in the persistence of truth in the Church, but he was clear that trial and error were part of that process. Truth was the daughter of time. The life of the Church was a dialectical process from which, in God's good time, balance would emerge. So, in the wake of what he thought were the burdens of the new doctrine of papal infallibility, time would soften and clarify what it actually meant. As he wrote, a new pope, and a reassembled Council, in time would "trim the boat."²⁰

Newman explained to one of his penitents, William Maskell:

Be still, and see the salvation of God. I think... things will in time gradually settle down and find their level. The rationale or theory which is to be held with reference to what has been done at Rome, will come out distinctly. We can't force things. The Council cannot force things. The voice of the *Scola Theologorum*, of the whole Church diffusive, will in time make itself heard, and Catholic instincts and ideas will assimilate and harmonize into the credenda of Christendom and the living tradition of the faithful, what at present many would impose upon us, and many are startled at, as a momentous addition to the faith.²¹

Newman's last great theological work revisited his Anglican thought about tradition and dogma in the light of those Catholic developments. In 1877, he republished his Anglican lectures on the Prophetical office but now with a momentous

²⁰ John Henry Newman to Alfred Plummer, April 3, 1871, in *Letters and Diaries*, vol. 25, *The Vatican Council*, pp. 308–10.

²¹ John Henry Newman to William Maskell, February 12, 1871, in *Letters and Diaries*, vol. 25, *The Vatican Council*, p. 284.

preface that was in part an argument with his younger Anglican self, and in part a distillation of what these recent Catholic debates about infallibility had taught him. The Preface to the third edition of the *Via Media* of 1877 is a highly original theological essay, hardly less original than the *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. In it, Newman challenged openly the monolithic understanding of the Church that seemed to have triumphed in Vatican I, in which authority, hierarchy or governance—what we would call the Magisterium—determine all aspects of religious life. Instead he proposed a radically dynamic model of the Church in which three very different but complementary energies constituted the Church's vitality, three principles or offices that existed in permanent, but creative, tension.

Newman relates these three energies to the threefold offices which unite in Christ. The Prophetical office, standing here not as in his Anglican lectures for the whole ethos of Christianity, but variously for revelation, for Christian teaching in all its forms, for the practice of theology, and for rational thought in religious matters. The second office was the priestly, which he explains as representing the spiritual, devotional, or what Friedrich von Hügel would later call the mystical elements of religion, everything from the Sacraments down to the practices of folk religion. And lastly there was the kingly or royal office, which Newman took as representing rule, governance, structure, institution, and being embodied in the papacy and its central institutions, the Curia. Interestingly, he doesn't talk about the episcopate at all.

These three powers or offices, he argued, were all essential and equal constituents of the concrete historical reality of the Body of Christ. But their different objects and scope inevitably meant that they pulled in quite different directions. So in a famous formulation he wrote:

Truth is the guiding principle of theology and theological inquiries; devotion and edification, of worship; and of government, expedience. The instrument of theology is reasoning; of worship, our emotional nature; of rule, command and coercion. Further, in man as he is, reasoning tends to rationalism, devotion to superstition and enthusiasm; and power to ambition and tyranny.²²

So the balance between these three, essential to the health of the Church, is always precarious, and in practice never adequately attained. He wrote:

Who, even with divine aid, shall successfully administer offices so independent of each other, so divergent, and so conflicting. What line of conduct, except on the long, the very long run, is at once edifying, expedient and true?²³

Newman here rejected any neatly hierarchical model of the Church as a pyramid in which truth equals authority and descended from above. His intention was to argue for an irreducibly dynamic understanding of the life of the Church,

²² John Henry Newman, *The Via Media of the Anglican Church Illustrated in Lectures, Letters and Tracts written between 1830 and 1841*, vol. 1 (London: B.M. Pickering, 1877), p. xli.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. xlii.

which reflected the ultimate ineffability of the divine mystery itself, and which therefore had to be worked at and often arrived at through tension and even conflict. The life of the Church is inescapably caught up in historical process. Even the truths of the faith are implicated in the messiness of history, and to proclaim them anew in changing cultures and circumstances, room had to be made for intellectual trial and error, the legitimate freedom of theological exploration, or, in his words, elbow room for great minds.

The life of the Church could never be one of a sealed and self-sufficient balance, raised tranquilly above confusion, contradiction, and error. Its life was a dialectical process, rich and life-giving, but consequently messy, and the tensions between the sometimes conflicting claims of truth, expediency and devotion would not be finally resolved this side of the eschaton, and must be lived with. As he wrote, in words that echoed his remarks about the Alexandrian Fathers in the *Apologia*:

Whatever is great refuses to be reduced to human rule, and to be made consistent in its many aspects with itself. Who shall reconcile with each other the various attributes of the infinite God?... This living world to which we belong, how self-contradictory it is, when we attempt to measure and master its meaning and scope...We need not feel surprised then, if Holy Church too, the supernatural creation of God, is an instance of the same law...crossed and discredited now and again by apparent anomalies

which need, and which claim, at our hands an exercise of faith.²⁴



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²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xciv.